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A bstract
Anglo American Corporation also known as Anglo was founded by Ernest 
Oppenheimer in 1917 by consolidating smaller mining companies to better exploit 
diamonds and gold deposits in South Africa. From its early days, Anglo played a 
critical role in the development of the South African economy. At its height, it owned 
manufacturing companies, financial houses, mining companies, industrial companies 
and car assembly companies. In 1999, Anglo transferred its primary stock to the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) four years after the end of apartheid. Following its 
move to London, Anglo sold its significant assets in South Africa at the same time 
purchasing more assets abroad. This paper focuses on Anglo’s reasons to shift its 
primary stock from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) to the London stock 
exchange.
Key words: Anglo American Corporation, African National Congress, National 
Party, London Stock Exchange, Johannesburg Stock Exchange, National Treasury, 
abroad, primary stock market
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 BACKGROUND
Anglo American Corporation Pic was founded in 1999 from the merger between 
Anglo American Corporation of South Africa and Anglo’s foreign subsidiary 
company Minorco.1 It is currently headquartered in the United Kingdom and has 
secondary listings in South Africa, Switzerland, Botswana and in Namibia (Hart and 
Padayachee, 2013: 70). Anglo is currently the World biggest producer of platinum, 
producing 40 percent of the World’s total platinum output. Other than platinum, it is 
also a major producer of metallurgical and thermal coal, copper, diamonds, iron ore, 
and nickel. It has operations in Africa, North America, South America, Europe, and 
Australasia.
In its earlier years, Anglo’s activities revolved around mining. By 1950s, Anglo began 
to expand into non-mining activities such as manufacturing, finance (through its 
ownership of FNB Bank), sugar (Huletts), media, pulp and paper (through its holding 
in Mondi) and the property market. In the 1960s when most big corporates were 
disinvesting and leaving the country in protest of apartheid laws which had triggered 
the Sharpeville massacres, Anglo remained behind (Fine and Rustomjee: 1996:161) 
buying shares from the companies that were disinvesting from South Africa and in the 
process spreading its influence beyond mining. By 1986, Anglo owned 86 JSE listed 
companies. In early 1990s, Anglo “controlled 60% of the JSE’s share value and 
contributed 40% of Africa’s total gross domestic product (GDP).
In the 1999, Anglo become the second South African company in the post-apartheid 
period to successfully transfer its primary stock to the LSE after BHP Billiton 
(formerly Gencor). Although this decision was blessed by the South African 
government, it was severely criticised by ANC’s tripartite alliance members-the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) and by the Congress of South African trade unions 
(COSATU). SACP and COSATU argued that the transfer of primary stocks to foreign
1 Minorco was founded by Anglo American Corporation in Luxembourg in 1961 to manage their 
overseas assets. It was founded by money Anglo was paid by the Zambian government after 
nationalising their copper mines in that country
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countries should have been prevented because they presented a vote of no confidence 
on the Mandela- led government and an attempt by white capitalists to prevent black 
people from benefiting from wealth held by these companies. The transfers took place 
at the time when Anglo and the South African government were finding each 
other.2Prior to this, Anglo and ANC’s relationship had been characterised by mistrust 
with Anglo despising ANC’s nationalisation policies; in-tum ANC loathed Anglo for 
benefiting from apartheid economic policies which exploited black African workers.
By the end of 2000, five South African companies namely Anglo, SAB Miller, Old 
Mutual, BHP Billiton and Dimension Data had transferred their primary stock to the 
London Stock Exchange (Walters and Prinsloo, 2002: 62). The reasons for doing so 
varied between different companies, others wanted to expand their businesses into 
international companies while others did not trust the future of South African 
capitalism on grounds of potential state intervention. The Government of South Africa 
in turn allowed the South African corporates to move abroad because they believed 
this move would result in an increase in capital inflows into the country. 
Furthermore, ANC allowed the listings to take place because the ANC was keen to 
establish its credentials as a credible government in an international context (Cohen, 
Interview, 15 January 2017).
1.2 R esearch  A im s and O bjectives
The aim of this paper is to prove that Anglo transferred its primary stock to London 
Stock Exchange out of its distrust of the future of South African capitalism-on 
grounds of potential state intervention. The key objectives of this study are as follows:
• Investigate the main reasons that led to Anglo American Corporation transferring 
its primary stock and headquarters to the London Stock Exchange
• Investigate how Anglo’s activities have changed since 1999.
2 Anglo and ANC’s contact was in September 1985 when Anglo sent its top management to Zambia to 
meet with Thabo Mbeki, OR Tambo and Joe Slovo. The purpose o f the meeting was to establish 
good relations with the ANC. After 1994, ANC continued to have regular meetings with Anglo and 
other businesses.
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1.3 R esearch  Q uestions
The research paper seeks to find answers to the following questions:
1. What were the factors that led to AAC abruptly shifting its primary stock market 
and headquarters to London in 1999, two years after Julian Ogilvie Thompson, who 
was then AAC Chairman, had committed the company’s future in South Africa in a 
Chairman’s letter to Shareholders dated (31 May 1996)?
2. How have AAC’s market activities changed since the company listed its primary 
stock market in the London Stock Exchange? Are these market changes in line with 
the objectives and goals that AAC set out in its application to the National Treasury 
(NT)?
1.4 R esearch  H yp oth esis
Given the above stated problem, the hypothesis of the research is as follows:
I. Anglo American Corporation Pic moved its headquarters and primary listing from 
Johannesburg to London because of the perceived political risk of doing business in 
South Africa under the African National Congress (ANC) government.
II. Anglo American Corporation moved its primary stock market abroad in 1999 to 
access cheap capital in London the international markets to invest back into its 
operations in South Africa.
1.5 R esearch  M ethod
The paper uses qualitative research instruments to investigate the reasons AAC listed 
its primary stock in London. The study uses key informant interviews and secondary 
data sources such as the AAC Pic website, financial newspaper articles (Financial 
Mail, Business Day, Wall Street Journal, Engineering News), and many more. Key 
informant interviews are a good instrument to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
reasons AAC gave to the National Treasury to seek a primary listing in London hence
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I choose to use them. Secondary data sources will be helpful in the study to 
understand the key questions around AAC’s market capitalisation trends, share price, 
and to trace the amount of capital that the company raised since moving to London in 
May 1999.
1.6 S ignificance o f  th e Study
The study is significant in that it shows that globalisation and liberalisation policies 
can have negative effects in developing countries. Instead of increasing capital 
inflows, exchange rate liberalisation has resulted in capital outflows and loss of 
revenue through dividend outflows to foreign countries. Government, private 
companies and development agencies will find this study significant in crafting of 
policies, directives, and regulations in developing economies.
1.8 Structure o f th e  p aper
This paper is structured in the following way. Section one provides a brief 
background of Anglo American Corporation and its decision to list abroad in 1999. 
Section two provides literature review. Section three looks at the economic and 
political context under which Anglo American Corporation developed in South Africa 
and Anglo’s relationship with the ANC. Section four looks at the implications and 
costs of Anglo’s decision to list their primary stock abroad. Section five is an analysis 
of findings and a recommendation section.
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Chapter 2
2.1. L iterature R eview
This section looks at the reasons why companies list their primary stock in foreign 
countries rather than in their countries of origin. According to empirical literature on 
foreign listings, firms list their primary stocks in foreign countries when doing so 
helps them to overcome market segmentation problems in their home countries and 
for financial reasons.
2.2 M arket Segm entation
According to (2000:37), firms transfer their stock into international markets to 
overcome market segmentation problems (investment barriers) and to improve 
liquidity of their stocks. Firms that transfer their primary stock abroad avoid 
fragmentation of capital markets and investment barriers in their home countries 
which depresses local security prices resulting in less competitiveness for shares 
issued in domestic markets. On the contrary, transferring primary stock abroad helps 
local firms to access cheaper capital abroad since foreign stock markets are more 
liquid than domestic stock markets. (Dodd, 2013:77).
Firms also list abroad to improve the profitability and competitiveness of their 
organizations. Research shows that firms that list in countries with established stock 
markets improve their profitability because reputable stock markets have lower 
market imperfections in-form of transaction costs, information costs, cultural barriers, 
capital controls, legal restrictions, and differences in equity trading costs and investor 
protection levels in different economies (Alexander et al, 1987:151) which causes the 
price of stocks to vary.
Market segmentation can be at an individual level or at company level. At an 
individual level, market segmentation takes place when certain individuals are 
restricted from investing in certain shares as a result of segmentation in capital 
markets. At a company level, market segmentation is caused by the presence of the 
factors mentioned above, such as transactional costs, legal restrictions and tax barriers
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in an economy (Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977:307). Alexander et al (1988:136) 
states that capital markets can be completely integrated, completely segmented, or 
partially segmented. In a completely segmented capital market, investors in one 
country are unable to buy shares in foreign countries. In a partially segmented 
market, investors in one country face certain challenges in investing in other 
countries’ securities. In completely integrated markets, investors from different 
countries have similar opportunities as local citizens to invest in local stocks 
(Alexander et al, 1988:137). Against this background, when capital markets are 
completely and partially segmented, firms will transfer their primary stock to foreign 
markets to improve their liquidity.
Bhana (2000:13) states that moving primary stock abroad improves ways in which 
firms raise their capital and the way which current shareholders sell their existing 
shares. Moving primary stock is therefore beneficial if the firm needs to raise capital 
and when financial constraints in their home countries are significant (Pagano et al 
2001:2653). According to Foster and Karolyi (1999:982), companies that list their 
stock abroad are secure from the risk premium which is associated with the use of 
unstable local currencies by firms in emerging markets. They are also safe from the 
volatility of the financing costs that are associated with firms from emerging market 
economies, whose currencies regularly lose value against global trading currencies.
2.3 F inancial R easons
Another reason firms transfer their primary stock to foreign countries according to 
(Bhana, 2000:13) is raise capital and to improve ways in which their current 
shareholders can sell existing shares. Moving primary stock is beneficial if the firm 
needs to raise capital and when financial constraints in their home countries are 
significant (Pagano et al 2001:2653). According to Foster and Karolyi( 1999:982), 
companies that list their stock abroad are secure from the risk premium which is 
associated with the use of unstable local currencies in emerging markets. Also, they 
are also safe from the volatility of the financing costs that are associated with firms
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from emerging market economies, whose currencies regularly lose value against 
global trading currencies. 2.4 Marketing and public relations benefits
Apart from financial gains, another reason local firms list abroad is to increase their 
publicity and recognition in foreign markets. According to Pagano et al (2001:2653), 
firms that list abroad capitalise on their product market reputation making it easier for 
them to issue new shares in foreign markets because investors in those markets 
already trust them and know them with their products. Other reasons that led firms to 
transfer their primary stock from their home countries to foreign countries are 
summarised below in table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the reasons firms list abroad
Location Advantages of the new host 
country conditions
•  Better legal regime and business climate 
conditions
-  Access to  Specialized service  p ro vid e rs
• Access to  E x e c u tive  ta lents
-  R epresents th e  cluster f o r  the  com panies  
o f th e  in d u s try
-  Access to  C a pita l M a rk e ts
New host country_______________________________
Motives dictated by the external 
environment
£
O
o
Disadvantages of home country 
conditions
-  Th re a ts  o r possible risks im posed b y  the  =
hast re g im e
-  Constraints o f  th e  countries w ith  sm all 
econom ies
o(_>
Home country
Motives dictated by internal stimuli
-  ro c  tilt at ion o f  in te ra c tio n  w ith  investors, 
analysts a n d  financial institutions
-  in te ra c tio n  w ith  k e y  cu stom e rs and  
p a rtn e rs  a n d  co m p e tito rs
-  fa c ilita tion  o f  in te ra ctio n  w ith  M e rg e d  or 
A cq u ire d  u n its
I
1
I
Q .£
ou
-  Shift o f  th e  ce n te r o f  g ra v ity  o f  the  
business o r  shift  in global outlook
-  ca s t R eduction
■ Plans fa r  in te rn a tio n a l Expansion Eo
U
New host country Home country
The table shows the advantages that firms derive from listing in foreign countries vis- 
a-vis having to stay at home.
2.5 Political Reasons
Other than market segmentation and financial reasons, firms also transfer their 
primary stock into overseas markets for political reasons. Often this happens when
12
firms and the government of the day differ in their roles in the economy-the 
government other than being a regulator may want to influence the day to day 
economic activities while firms on the other hand want autonomous in their day to 
day activities. If the standoff between firms and government is not resolved, firms 
will take their business elsewhere. In some instances, firms transfer their stock 
markets in protest of economic and political policies in their home countries.
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Chapter 3: E conom ic con tex t and background
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses economic and political developments in South Africa under 
which Anglo American Corporation evolved in the 1920s up to the period when it 
transferred its primary stock and headquarters to London in 1999. The first section of 
this chapter looks at the economic and political history of South Africa; the second 
section of this chapter provides an analysis of Anglo’s brief corporate history; the 
third section summarises Anglo’s relations with the ANC prior to the London listing 
in 1999. The chapter concludes by analysing the reasons that led Anglo to list in 
London in 1999.
3.2 E conom ic and  Political h istory  o f South Africa
South Africa’s economic development started with the discovery of diamond and gold 
deposits in Kimberly, the Witwatersrand, and later in the Free-state Province 
(Hattingh, 2007:2). Anglo played a significant role in this development. Before the 
discovery of diamonds and gold deposits in the country, the South African economy, 
to a large extent, had been characterised by mostly agricultural activities and small 
uncoordinated mining activities across the country.
Anglo American Corporation, Gencor (now Billiton) and South African Breweries 
(SAB), to mention a few, were established at this time when mining activities were 
still uncordinated. They later went on to play a significant role towards the 
development of the South African economy in the 20th century alongside other mining 
houses such as Rand Mines which had been established earlier. According to Fine and 
Rustomjee (1996:127), the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa shifted 
the country’s economic focus from an agro-based economy to a mineral energy 
complex economy with diamonds and gold as the main anchors of economic growth. 
In the early days, mining houses were either owned by white English South Africans 
or white Afrikaner South Africans. The two did not like each other; Afrikaner white 
South Africans despised white English South Africans because they were rich and
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better educated than them. Their rivalry also extended into their businesses were 
Anglo American Corporation which was predominantly English competed with 
Sanlam, a company that was conceived a year later than them in 1918 and represented 
the interests of the Afrikaner people.
The English population’s dominance over the Afrikaners in the early period of South 
Africa’s industrialisation history was aided by the fact that the South African Party 
(later United Party), which governed South Africa from the late 1890s to 1945 had 
advanced their interests resulting in English-owned companies, such as Anglo 
growing rich and diversifying into different sectors of the South African economy 
(Hattingh, 2007: 4). The Afrikaners, however, had their time after the 1948 elections 
when the National Party defeated the United Party and set out on a path to blatantly 
advance the interests of the Afrikaner people and companies over those of the English 
or any other groups by making it a government policy to fund Afrikaner companies 
such as Volkas and Sanlam and at the same time prioritising employment of Afrikaner 
people to the public service.
According to Fine and Rustomjee (1996:148) following the National Party’s victory 
in the 1948 elections, the number of “Afrikaner farmers, financial capitalists, small 
traders, and workers all received massive direct and indirect hand-outs from the 
government in the decade after 1948”. The promotion of Afrikaner finance capital 
resulted in the increase of the number of Afrikaner white speakers who occupied 
influential positions in business after 1948.
For the English speaking whites, the National Party’s surprise victory over the United 
Party in 1948 shocked them as the United Party government had been ideal for their 
business interests. The defeat prompted the English speaking whites to fund the 
establishment of a new political party, the Progressive Party, whose agenda was to 
unseat the National Party government. Harry Oppenheimer from Anglo, an English 
speaker, was one of the biggest funders of this party and, when their plans to unseat 
the National Party failed in the 1950s, English manufacturing companies subsequently 
warmed up to the National Party and voluntarily began to hand over some of the 
largest and most profitable assets to the National Party government who subdivided 
them to the burgeoning Afrikaner capitalists (Hattingh, 2007:5). At a state level, the
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National Party government played a further critical role towards the formation of 
state-owned companies such as Sasol, Denel and Iscor, whose objectives were to 
create employment for the Afrikaner population (Marais, 2000: 17) and to dilute the 
English dominance over the Afrikaners in South Africa. In pursuit of this objective 
the National Party, under the leadership of Hendrik Verwoerd, spent more money on 
improving education, health facilities, and recreational facilities for the white 
Afrikaners (Marais, 2000: 20) while also allowing trade unions representing white 
Afrikaner workers to enter into collective bargaining agreements with their employers 
(Hattingh, 2007:5).
While the National Party segregated and favoured Afrikaners in its policies of capital 
accumulation, overall their policies were a success with South Africa in the in 1960s 
recording increase in economic growth of 6% achieved against the background of the 
success of the mining companies which had successfully diversified their operations 
from mining related activities into other economic sectors such as manufacturing and 
financial services (Hattingh, 2007:5-6). The success of the economy at this stage was 
also aided by the involvement of the South African state in the economy through 
establishment of state-owned companies such as Eskom, Iscor, Sasol, and Denel, 
which later played a key role in the industrialisation process in South Africa.
Economic success was also aided by the increase in demand for consumer goods by 
the white population which continued until the early 1970s and resulted in many 
multinational firms and subsidiaries setting up plants in South Africa, while some 
mining houses also set up their own industrial interests. According to Hattingh (2007: 
7), this growth began to slow down in the mid-1970s when the global economy 
started to suffer from the effects of over accumulation of capital and over production 
of consumer goods caused an unprecedented fall in profits in the manufacturing 
industry world-wide.
In South Africa, the crises in the 1970s was caused by the over production of 
consumer goods such as textiles, chemicals, and motor vehicles for the small white 
population (Hattingh, 2007: 6-7). Since these goods were produced for a relatively 
small white population, these goods were unsold because supply exceeded demand 
and exports also declined. That profitability in the 1970s declined is evident in
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economic growth figures which show that “between 1973 and 1984 economic growth 
in South Africa slowed to an average of 1.9 percent per annum” (Hattingh, 2007:7).
In response to the over accumulation and slow demand crises in South Africa, the 
National Party government increased foreign borrowings for investment in state- 
owned parastatals such as Eskom, Iscor, and Sasol, while conglomerates were forced 
to re-strategize their operations in order to restore profitability in their companies to 
pre-crisis levels. As part of re-strategizing, some of the country’s biggest 
multinational companies embarked on expansion programmes abroad to compensate 
for low profits in South Africa and to protect their companies from possible rand 
devaluations (Legassick, 2006: 9). Those that remained in South Africa restructured 
and unbundled their operations and focused on more lucrative financial activities and 
speculation, while other companies mechanised and reduced the size of their 
workforce. According to Bond (2005:34-40), the expansion of South African firms 
into foreign markets in the 1970s later led to an increase in capital flight in the 
country with companies such as Gencor taking advantage of the relaxation of 
exchange controls to export US$4 billion to Europe after listing abroad. Another firm, 
South African Breweries, shipped US$5 billion to the North and South American 
markets for their expansion programs there (Currey, 1989) all at the time when the 
reserve bank partially attempted to liberalise exchange control regulations before 
1985.
Having realised the failure of this policy and that big conglomerate were taking 
advantage of it, the central bank re-introduced capital control measures after 1985 to 
stem the flow of capital from the country, but big monopoly companies still came up 
with other ways to circumvent these new exchange control measures. One of the 
methods the conglomerates used to illegally circumvent exchange control measures 
was the transfer pricing method which involved issuing fraudulent invoices between 
their South African operations and their overseas operations (Hattingh, 2007: 7-8). 
The second method used by South African companies involved the use of financial 
and banking institutions owned by these companies to illegally transfer money abroad 
by means of by-passing exchange rate controls and establishing international 
investment companies in foreign countries such as the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Luxembourg, and Switzerland (Hattingh, 2007:7-8) The use of
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foreign investment companies benefited South African companies who wanted to 
invest abroad during apartheid in two ways. Firstly it enabled South African 
companies to break international sanctions and an opportunity to be able do business 
in countries which otherwise would not have been possible under sanctions. 
Secondly, it enabled local companies to keep their profits abroad rather than to 
repatriate them back to South Africa where profit levels were low.
However, avoiding sanctions through the establishment of foreign investment 
companies proved not to be enough to improve profitability levels and this realisation 
led to South African firms feeling left behind by their competitors globally who could 
do business anywhere in the World without any political hindrance. With this in mind, 
South African companies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, led by Anglo, began to 
engage with the African National Congress (ANC) in exile in order to negotiate a 
political settlement in the country that would ameliorate apartheid rule and also bring 
an end to the international isolation of South African companies. The talks began in 
1990 and led to a new democratic South Africa led by Nelson Mandela in 1994. 
While the talks were generally aimed at finding a political solution to the country’s 
challenges, conglomerates also become the biggest beneficiaries of these talks when 
businesses, that were part of the negotiations, convinced the new government to adopt 
neo-liberal economic policies that included liberalising of markets, granting 
independence to the central bank, abandoning the nationalisation policy, and adopting 
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy strategy (GEAR) in 1996. The 
GEAR policy made it easy for firms to move capital abroad.
Besides adopting the GEAR policy and the abandonment of nationalisation policy, the 
new government also helped businesses by abandoning the Financial Rand System in 
1995, which had been first implemented in 1985 to prevent large capital outflow from 
the country. By abandoning it, businesses were allowed to legally move capital abroad 
upon receiving consent from the central bank. The biggest assistance that the ANC 
government rendered to big conglomerates as part of its post 1994 neo-liberal policies 
was allowing big companies to move their primary stock to foreign markets. In 
allowing the companies to list abroad, the government had reasoned that doing so 
would help to increase inward investments in the country, while companies on their 
part argued that being listed abroad would enable them to raise cheap capital there to
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invest back in South Africa. With the above cited expectations, the South African 
government allowed local big conglomerates to list abroad in the late 1990s and early 
2000s and one of those companies that were allowed to list abroad was Anglo 
American South Africa, now known as Anglo American Corporation.
3.3 C orporate h istory  o f  AAC
Anglo American Corporation Pic (AAC) is a multinational company which was 
founded in South Africa in 1917 by Ernest Oppenheimer and is now headquartered in 
London, in the United Kingdom. Anglo was first founded as a gold mining company 
after the discovery of gold deposits in the Johannesburg’s East Rand region and it 
spread its influence into the diamond industry when it took control of Cecil John 
Rhodes’s De Beers in 1924, who were then the world’s biggest producer of diamonds. 
From 1917 Anglo played a significant role towards the development and the 
industrialisation of the South African economy. However, since the company 
relocated to London, no other company locally has been able to fill the gap that Anglo 
left behind in South Africa. At its peak Anglo owned mining companies, 
manufacturing companies, industrial companies, financial institutions, automobile 
companies, media companies and had interests in the forestry sector through its stake 
in Mondi.
Anglo was founded at a time when English capitalists and Afrikaner capitalists in 
South Africa were fighting each other for political and economic domination over 
each other. Upon its founding, Anglo represented English capital interests while 
Gencor and Sanlam represented Afrikaner capital interests (Manson and Mbenga, 
2003:27). In the early years, Anglo had on their board heavyweights, “such as 
William Thompson, the founder of the giant US mining company, Newmont, and 
Hamilton Sabin of Guranty Trust, who represented the interests of JP Morgan” 
(Padayachee 2008:12). In 1924, Anglo become the largest shareholder in the De Beers 
Diamond Company and formally established the cross holdings linking the two 
companies in 1929 (Chabane et al 2006:551).
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In its earlier years, Anglo’s activities revolved around mining, but this changed in the 
1930s when the company began to expand into non-mining activities such as 
manufacturing, finance (through its ownership of FNB Bank), sugar (Huletts), media, 
pulp and paper (through its holding in Mondi) and the property market. Anglo’s 
venture into non-mining activities was aided by the country’s rapid economic growth 
and industrialisation in the 1930s and 1940s. In the 1950s, Anglo was also involved 
in the development of the local money market through Ernest Oppenheimer, who 
helped to set up the National Finance Corporation (Hart and Padayachee 2013: 69). 
In 1961 Anglo ventured outside Africa for the first time when the company bought a 
stake in a Canadian mining company, Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Company. 
Before moving to Canada in the 1960s, “Anglo American had begun its expansion 
beyond South Africa in the 1920s when it commenced exploration activities in 
Zambia leading to the discovery of the Zambian copper belt” (Robinson, 2012: 770). 
When these mines were nationalised by the Zambian government in the 1960s, Anglo 
used the money they received from the Zambian authorities to fund the creation of an 
offshore company called Mineral and Resource Company (Minorco), which was 
founded in Luxembourg. Anglo’s second international acquisition was in 1975 when 
Anglo purchased a 49% stake in a Brazilian gold mine company, Morro Vehlo Gold 
Mine.
Locally, the closed economic environment and the international isolation of South 
Africa in the 1960s and 1970s caused Anglo to diversify its activities, purchasing 
stakes from foreign companies that were disinvesting from South Africa in protest 
against the country’s racial laws, (Keeton, Interview, 23 February, 2017). According 
to an on line article by the South African civil society information service by (Ashton, 
2011) it was at this time that Anglo, under the leadership of Harry Oppenheimer, 
acquired interests in industrial interests in the 1960s including stakes in fertilizer, 
forestry, sugar production, car dealership, banking, and mining companies. Anglo’s 
diversification into the above non-mining activities was caused by their failure to 
invest outside the country due to the presence of capital control measures in the 
country, preventing South African companies from moving capital outside the 
country’s borders. Just like any other policy, this policy also had its own advantages 
and disadvantages. The obvious disadvantage being that it prevented Anglo from 
expanding globally in the 1960s and 1970s, while the advantage of this policy was
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that it aided Anglo’s development such that in 1974, according to (Amin, 1987:16), 
the assets owned by Anglo were estimated to have been close to US$7.4billion, which 
was at that time equivalent to a quarter of South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). In addition, it produced a quarter of South Africa’s uranium and coal needs 
single-handedly. Anglo’s development during this period was also aided by the lack 
of competition from international companies which were prevented from doing 
business in South Africa by the United Nations in protest against the country’s 
apartheid policies.
Aided by this ban on international companies from doing business in South Africa, 
Anglo’s influence in the country continued to grow such that by 1982, Anglo directly 
and indirectly controlled 70% of the total number of shares listed on the Johannesburg 
stock exchange (JSE) and was the single largest foreign investor in the United States 
of America (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996:10). According to an online article on 
Moneweb by (Cairns, 2011), in 1987, A AC owned companies controlled 60% of the 
total market capitalization of the JSE through its 80 listed companies while in 1990 
they accounted for 44.2 % of the total market capitalization of JSE, (Hattingh, 
2007:8).
Table 2 Summary of control of Johannesburg stock exchange market capitalisation
1985 1990 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 3 2004
A n g lo  Am erican Corp 53.6 44.2 3 8 9 22.7 23.3 18.7
Sanlam 12.2 13.2 12.7 11.2 6.1 2.7
Stanbic/Liberty Life 2.0 2.6 5.8 9.0 5.2 4.7
Rem brandt/Rem gro 3.8 13.6 13.2 10 2 9.2 7.9
SA M utual/Old Mutual 10.6 10.2 11.2 1 0 4 9.9 4.5
Anglovaal 2.1 2.5 3.1 1.2 0 0
Black-ow ned groups - - - 7.4 4.2 6.3
Top 5 groups collectively 82.3 83 .9 8 5 9 70.6 53.6 38.5
a Control is assessed by taking into account the various cross-holdings o f shares that exist and 
may be associated with a relatively small direct shareholding in any given company.
Source: McGregors (various years).
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The table above summarizes Anglo’s market’s change in capitalization from 1985 to 
2004 and shows that the company’s market capitalisation declined from 53.6% in 1985 to 
18.7% in 2004.
3.4  ANC's relationsh ip  w ith  b u s in e sse s  s in ce  1 9 9 0
Before the 1990s, the ANC‘s relationship with businesses was characterised by 
animosity and hatred. The ANC despised businesses because they had been major 
beneficiaries of the National Party’s skewed apartheid economic policies. Businesses 
in turn did not trust the ANC government because of the ANC‘s stance on 
nationalisation. The ANC’s hatred of businesses emanated from the fact that 
businesses had directly benefited from apartheid’s economic policies and had never 
denounced apartheid when they had an opportunity to do so. In turn businesses did 
not trust the ANC government because at the time when the ANC was still an illegal 
organisation, the ANC had threatened to nationalise all big companies in the country 
in the event that there governed the country.
Whatever mistrust that existed between the ANC and businesses was quickly watered 
down in the 1990s when the ANC government liberalised financial markets and, in 
the process, allowed South African companies to list their primary stock abroad. By 
doing so, the ANC, and Mandela in particular, become so close to businesses that 
when Mandela’s marriage to Winnie Mandela ended, he went to stay with Douw 
Steyn, a self-made well-respected insurance tycoon (Gumede, 2007:85). Having 
become close to businesses some observers points out that the ANC sold out in their 
negotiations with businesses at CODESA, as the outcome of negotiations maintained 
the existing status quo in which white people were still allowed to maintain their 
wealth, land, mines, manufacturing firms, and financial institutions for themselves, 
while black people continued to wallow in poverty and to be subjected to high levels 
of unemployment.
By changing its policy direction, the ANC surprised a lot of people, among them, the 
South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Union, who
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viewed the adoption of these policies as a continuation of white monopoly power in 
the country and a betrayal of the values of the liberation struggle as enshrined in the 
Freedom Charter document. The Freedom Charter document policy stipulated that 
nationalisation was the economic policy of the ANC party and that, when the ANC 
took over the country, it was going to nationalise all big mines and banks. The 
ANC’s move to implement pro-market policies and to abandon the nationalisation 
policy caught a lot of observers by surprise, given that, in his first speech after been 
released from prison, ANC leader Nelson Mandela had reassured the masses that “The 
nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy of the ANC 
and a change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable” Marais 
(1990:146). His change of mind indicated that indeed Mandela, and the ANC, had 
been captured by business.
Having been captured by business, as some people say, the ANC government 
liberalised the markets and allowed free movement of capital and goods. It also 
allowed major companies to transfer their headquarters and primary stock overseas, 
while rejecting an economic policy proposition by Macroeconomic Research Group 
(MERG) that pushed for economic growth through redistribution (Gumede, 2007: 86- 
87). By allowing big companies to move their headquarters and primary stock abroad, 
the government indirectly allowed South African capital and wealth to be 
externalised. The relationship between the ANC and business was to be further 
cemented by the establishment of weekly forum meetings between businesses and 
government, who meet on a regular basis to discuss pertinent issues affecting 
businesses in the country (Bruce-Brand, Interview, 2017).
3.5 Anglo's en gag em en t w ith  th e African N ational 
C ongress and th e p o litics o f  th e transition  p eriod
Anglo’s relationship with the ANC dates back to the days when the ANC was still an 
illegal organisation in the country. Their relationship can first be described as a love- 
hate relationship, because at first, in the 1960s and 1970s, the ANC viewed Anglo 
with suspicion. This was due to the fact that Anglo had been part of the capitalists that
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benefited from the country’s economic policies that exploited black workers in mines. 
Anglo’s relationship with the ANC began to improve in the 1980s when a business 
delegation was dispatched to Zambia to meet with ANC leaders in exile. Their 
purpose in Zambia was to engage the ANC leaders in exile and also sell them an idea 
for a negotiated political settlement in the county. ANC agreed to this meeting.
The ANC delegation that attended this meeting in Lusaka in 1985 comprised of 
Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, Chris Hani, Mac Maharaj, Pallo Jordan, and James 
Stuart. The business delegation on the other hand was led by Gavin Relly from Anglo, 
Tony Bloom from the Premier Group, Harald Pakendorf, editor of Die Vaderland, 
Tertius Myburgh, editor of The Sunday Times, Hugh Murray, editor of Leadership 
SA, and some opposition leaders (SA history online, 2012). The first meeting was 
convened by the Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda and it took place at his game 
lodge in Mfuwe. While the meeting in Zambia was successful, Relly, on his return 
from Zambia, was severely criticized by the National Party’s PW Botha and by Anglo 
for attending the meeting, having been warned by Harry Oppenheimer not to travel to 
Lusaka.
Being in the forefront of initiating talks between the ANC and the NP, Anglo 
achieved two goals at once. Firstly, it developed a good relationship with the 
incoming new ANC government and, secondly, the negotiations gave them an 
opportunity to negotiate with the ANC for policies that favoured its interests. The 
negotiations, besides bringing together the ANC and the NP to the negotiation table, 
also brought other smaller parties, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party and other small 
organizations to the negotiation table. During the negotiations, the IFP at some point 
pulled out and threatened not to participate in the first democratic elections in 1994. 
IFP’s withdrawal and threats of not participating in the elections led to a brief period 
of civil unrest in the country as it led to infighting between ANC and IFP supporters 
(Rajak, 2014:273). Several diplomats were called to diffuse the tension between the 
IFP and the ANC. One such diplomat, who was called and who failed to convince the 
IFP to change their decision of not wanting to participate in the elections, was Henry 
Kissinger, an American diplomat. According to Rajak (2014:272) the impasse was 
broken by the intervention of Anglo executives who worked behind the scenes to 
convince Mongesuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to participate in
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the elections in 1994 and to drop their demands of a separate KwaZulu Natal state 
(Rajak, 2014:272). Interestingly, before Anglo courted the ANC, Anglo had earlier 
endorsed Mongesuthi Buthelezi of the IFP as the future president of the post-apartheid 
republic (Rajak, 2014:273) and loathed the ANC and its socialist policies.
Besides convincing the IFP, according to (Rajak, 2014: 272-273) Anglo also helped to 
prevent the outbreak of civil war in South Africa after the assassination of Chris Hani. 
This was done through Bobby Godsell who worked with other business executives 
and church leaders to help broker a peace deal that prevented the country from 
plunging into another war in retaliation of Chris Hani’s murder by left wing white 
extremists. ANC members were disgruntled following the assignation of Hani and 
wanted revenge for his death by taking up arms. Anglo also helped the ANC 
financially in the 1990s when they donated R150 million for the ANC’s preparation 
for the 1994 elections (Africa Confidential Vol. 41 No 2 of (2000). When Nelson 
Mandela was released from prison, he also had many encounters with Harry 
Oppenheimer as his guest at his mansion in Brenthurst.
3.6  The 1 9 9 0 s  - Anglo m ove to London
In 1994 when the ANC government assumed political power, the first thing it did was 
to adopt neo-liberal economic policies, such as GEAR, that allowed companies to 
move capital freely between countries upon consent from the Central Bank. Coming 
from a context of a closed economy where South African companies, prior to 1994 
could not transfer capital freely to other countries due to exchange control regulations 
and international sanctions on South African companies, major conglomerates in the 
country, such as Anglo, then took advantage of this policy in the 1990s to move its 
primary stock to foreign markets. Gencor was the first South African company to 
transfer its primary stock to a foreign country in a post independent South Africa in 
the 1990s, and were followed by Anglo who transferred its primary stock and 
headquarters to London in May 1999.
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Anglo’s argument to the government was that listing in London was critical for their 
future survival in the country and that it would result in an increase in investments in 
the South Africa. Contrary to their argument, investment flows into the country have 
not increased but, instead, Anglo’s investments abroad have increased. “Save of 
purchasing Kumba iron ore company, Anglo has not made any significant investments 
in the country” (Spicer, Interview, 7 March, 2017).
According to Spicer, Anglo’s decision to transfer its primary stock to London in 1999 
was a response to the effects of globalisation in the mining sector. Spicer notes that 
Anglo had no choice but to list in London because all their big rival mining 
companies were already located there, and that had Anglo not listed in London, other 
bigger companies in London, or elsewhere who had strong financial power, would 
have taken control of Anglo through hostile takeovers. Lack of bigger capital markets 
in South Africa is also cited as one of the reasons Anglo moved to London in the 
1990s (Interview, Keeton, 2017). Other proponents of the London listing state that 
Anglo listed in London in 1999 because the South African market had become too 
small for them (Cohen, interview, 15 Jan 2017) and state that by listing in London, 
Anglo had assumed its rightful place among other corporate mining giants in the 
World.
Anglo’s decision to transfer its primary stock to London was criticised by COSATU 
and SACP, who viewed the move as an expression of a vote of no confidence in the 
Mandela-led government and a punishment of the ANC government for believing in 
socialist policies prior to 1994. According to Kreamer (2016) writing on Engineering 
Newsletter, Anglo’s move abroad had nothing to do with Anglo’s desire to access 
cheap capital in London, but was rather motivated by Anglo’s lack of trust in the 
ANC government and its policies.
According to Cohen (Interview, 15 January, 2017) Anglo moved its primary stock to 
London May 1999 in order to protect its assets from being possibly nationalised in 
future by the new ANC government. This move by Anglo was unexpected because 
Anglo had become much closer to the ANC in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, at the 
time when Anglo executives led the negotiation talks. This move meant that Anglo 
did not trust the ANC and its policies. Interestingly, when Anglo faced a similar
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situation in the 1940s, following the rise into power of the National Party government, 
Anglo reacted by co-operating with the National Party government and even went out 
of its way to accommodate and cooperate with their rival Afrikaner-led businesses. 
But when the ANC ascended into power, Anglo reacted in a different way by 
disengaging themselves from the South African economy by transferring their 
headquarters and primary stock to London on the 17th of May 1999, even though the 
economic conditions under Mandela were better than in the 1940s when Anglo co­
operated and worked with the National Party government. Mohammed (2010:14) 
states that businesses such as Anglo transferred their primary public listings away 
from South Africa for fear of being “punished for their support or at least their failure 
to oppose apartheid, and that they worried that measures to ensure black economic 
empowerment by the government would have a negative effect on their businesses”.
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Chapter 4: Im plications and costs o f  listing  in th e London 
Stock Exchange
4.1  Introduction
This chapter analyses the structure and activities of Anglo American Corporation in 
the last seventeen years and seeks to highlight how they have changed since the 
company migrated to London in 1999. To do so, this chapter analyses Anglo in the 
last seventeen years in terms of changes in its market capitalisation, share value price, 
net debt, dividend payments, mergers, and acquisitions, inflows and outflows of 
capital since it moved to London in 1999
4.2  M arket C apitalisation sin ce  1 9 9 9  in  Dollars and  
Pounds
Anglo was ranked in the top 20 of the highly capitalised companies when it listed in 
the London Stock Exchange in 1999 and was included in the FTSE top 100 index that 
tracks the shares of highly capitalised companies that are listed at the London stock 
exchange (Cohen 2016). When Anglo listed in London in 1999, it was valued at $22 
billion dollars and were more capitalised than their peers such as Rio Tinto, BHP 
Billiton, and Fresnillo.
In its first six years in London, Anglo’s market capitalisation is said to have increased 
from $22 billion in 1999 to $78 billion in 2006 (Anglo Annual Reports, 2007). 
According to industry analysts, the increase in Anglo’s market capitalisation between 
1999 and 2006 was caused by the increase in global prices of commodities which 
Anglo mined and to the issuance of additional new shares by Anglo after listing 
abroad.
Another reason which led to an increase in Anglo’s market capitalisation in the early 
2000s was the unbundling of Anglo’s noncore assets in the early 2000s which 
increased their revenue flows (Anglo Annual Report, 2000). In 2007, Anglo’s market 
capitalisation fell from $78 billion in 2006 to below $40 billion in 2009 (figure 1 
below) as a result of the decline in commodity prices which was caused by the 
financial global crises of 2007 and 2008. The globally financial crises slowed down 
the demand of commodities by the Chinese market and resulted in Anglo undergoing 
a mini recession between 2007 and 2009 (Groenewald, 2011:17).
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Figure 1
Source: Yahoo! Finance
The graph above (figure 1) shows that from 1999-Anglo American Corporation’s market 
capitalisation gradually increased from $22 billion dollars in 1999 to $78 billion dollars in 2006 
and decreased between 2007 and 2009, before increasing again from 2009 to 2012 and declining 
thereafter.
In 2010 and 2011, Anglo’s market capitalisation began to rise again following the 
end of the global financial crises and due to the increase in commodity demand in 
China. This time however the increase in market capitalisation was to be short-lived 
for Anglo, who during the period of commodity boom had made serious investment 
mistakes, such as borrowing $6 billion dollars to purchase Brazilian iron ore mine, 
Rio Minas. According to Spicer (Interview, 06 March 2017) if Anglo had stayed in 
South Africa, the Brazilian iron ore mine would not have purchased because Harry 
Oppenheimer the leader of Anglo was debt averse. Another reason that contributed to 
the decline in Anglo’s market capitalisation was the unbundling of Anglo’s non 
mining assets which led to a decrease in their revenue streams. Anglo’s market 
capitalisation declined again from 2012 to 2016. By 2014, the value of Anglo4s 
market capitalisation was $17 billion dollars and $5.6 billion in 2015 (SABC News, 2 
February 2015).
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Anglo’s decline in market capitalisation in the post London period was epitomised by 
the company losing its place among the top 20 companies in Britain that are highly 
capitalised as Anglo finished the year 2016 ranked at number 31, 10 places lower than 
when it listed in London in 1999 (Cairns, 2011). While Anglo had been more 
capitalised than Rio Tinto or BHP Billiton when they listed in London in 1999, Anglo 
is now the least capitalised mining company in comparison to all of the major mining 
companies that are listed in the FTSE top 100 index at the London stock exchange 
(SABC News, 2 February 2016).
4.3  An an a lysis in to  AAC Pic's Share p rice fluctuations
One of the reasons that Anglo moved abroad was to try and reduce the 25 percent 
discount in which their shares were trading to the value of their total assets. 
According to Hattingh (2007:11), “before moving to London, Anglo American 
Corporation’s shares were trading at 20 percent below their net asset value”. Listing 
in London enabled Anglo to reverse this situation such that by 2001 Anglo-American 
shares were trading at 37 percent above their actual asset price. The Public investment 
corporation (PIC) is the biggest institutional shareholder at Anglo and 13.31 percent 
of Anglo’s shares in 2016.
When Anglo first listed their primary stock market on the London Stock exchange in 
1999, its shares were valued at £33.20 per share, 10 percent higher than the predicted 
market price (CNN Money, 1999). The increase in share price was caused by an 
increase in the number of international investors who purchased Anglo’s shares after 
Anglo listed in London. According to (Anglo’s Annual statement,2000) the number of 
Anglo’s international shareholders who purchased Anglo’s shares increased by 36 
percent in 2000 among the British, American, and European public shareholder in 
Anglo’s first year in the United Kingdom.
In 2001, Anglo’s share price increased to £45.34 per share compared to £33.20 per 
share in 1999. The increase in share value was at first was caused by Anglo’s decision 
to restructure and to unbundle some of their non-core mining activities, which 
delighted their international investors who had long complained of not being able to
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understand the company as it was too diversified. Secondly the share price rally was 
also a result of the improved performance by Anglo following an increase in the 
global commodity prices (Cohen, Interview, 15 January, 2017).
Like other companies Anglo had failed to realise that the commodity price boom in 
the early 2000s was temporary. During the period Anglo had borrowed heavily to 
fond the acquisition of some of their assets abroad, most notably the Minas iron ore 
mine in Brazil. Anglo purchased the mine for $6 billion dollars, and spent another $12 
billion to develop it (Keeton, Interview, 23 February, 2017). According to Cohen 
(Interview, 15 January, 2017) Anglo’s Cynthia Carroll was warned against purchasing 
this mine after Anglo’s engineers had assessed it and deemed the mine not to be 
suitable for purchase. Carroll nevertheless approved the purchase. Anglo had hoped 
that Rio Minas would be profitable, but the when the prices of copper, platinum, and 
nickel declined by 65 percent, 59 percent and 69 percent respectively, Anglo share 
price also declined to £29.09 per share in 2007 and £19.45 in 2009 and left them 
highly indebted (Anglo Annual Reports, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009).
Amid the collapse in share price, Anglo’s board suspended payments of dividends to 
its shareholders in 2009 for the first time since 1930s. Anglo’s share price temporarily 
rebounded in 2010 and 2011, buoyed by an increase in demand of from China again 
after the end of the global financial crises (Cape Times, 2013), but fell once more 
from 2012. Anglo’s share price increased from £19.45 in 2009 to £26.71 in 2011, and 
£27.96. In 2013 and 2015, Anglo’s share again decreased to £21.43 and £12.05 
respectively and payments of dividends was suspended again in 2016.
Figure 2 below summaries the trend in AAC’s share price from 2000 to 2016 and it 
shows that in 2015, Anglo’s share price fell by more than 75 percent (Cape Times, 
2016)
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Share price and volum e graph for A nglo A m e rica n  P L C -L S E  from  2A May 1999 to 31 May 
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Figure 2 above shows that AAC’s share price increased initially from 1999 to 2007 then fell in 
2008 and 2009 before rising again between 2010 and 2012 and decreasing thereafter in 2013 and 
slightly recovering again in early 2016. Source; AAC website
4 .4  Anglo's N et D ebt Equity from  1 9 9 8  to 2 0 1 5
Anglo American Corporation provides a good case study of what happens to a 
company when there has been too much borrowing and poor capital allocation 
(Sunday News, 27 November 2016). According to Cohen (interview, 15 January, 
2017) and Spicer (interview, 07 March, 2017) the debt that Anglo is currently 
grappling with emanated from the purchase of Minas Rio Iron Ore Company from 
MMX for $6 billion in 2007 and cost them $12 billion to develop.
Besides the Rio Minas debt, Anglo also accumulated more debt in the last seventeen 
years in London. One such case was in 2001 when Anglo’s net debt increased from 
$3,560 billion to $5,578 billion in 2002 after Anglo purchased Disputada Base Metals 
Company in Chile from Exxon Mobil Corporation. This transaction saw its net debt to 
total capital ratio increasing to 23.1 percent in comparison to 12.2 percent of the 
previous year. A closer analysis on Anglo’s performance post 1999 shows that its 
debts began to rise at the time it listed in London, and that this was caused by its 
unrestricted purchases of assets abroad. This saw Anglo’s debts increasing from 
$5,578 in 2002 to $ 11, 7 billion in 2016 (Financial Times, 2016). According to
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Biesheuvel et al (2016), Anglo’s debts in February 2016 stood at $ 13 billion, twice 
more than the company’s stock market value which was valued at $6, 7 billion.
This poor state of Anglo’s debt was demonstrated in its decision to suspend payment 
of dividends to its shareholders for the second time since 1930. In addition to 
suspending payment of dividends in 2016, Anglo also announced plans to retrench 
some of its employees and to sell some of its coal and iron ore assets in South Africa 
in order to conserve cash and reduce its debts. The plans to sell coal and iron ore 
assets have, however, been put on hold for now.
The graph below illustrates how Anglo’s debts have increased since 2006.
Fig 3
Source: Bloomberg News
4. 5 Change in  Anglo's Profit M argins from  1 9 9 9  to 2 0 1 5
Just like the trend in market capitalisation and share price, Anglo’s profits also 
increased in the first few years that preceded its move to London, then decreased in 
2007 and 2008 and again in 2012 to 2016. Anglo’s profits increased by 24% in its 
first year as a London listed company. According to Rajak (2014: 264), the increase in 
Anglo’s profitability in its first year in London was caused by the company’s bold 
decision to reduce the risk of its assets in South Africa, by transferring its primary
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stock and headquarters to London in 1999. Anglo’s profitability in its earlier years in 
London was, in part, caused by the advantages of now being valued in the more stable 
dollar currency. Anglo’s commodities were now traded in dollars against the rand, the 
currency in which most of Anglo’s operating costs were paid (Carmody, 2002: 268)
According to Cohen (Interview, 15 January, 2017) the increase in Anglo’s 
profitability during its earlier years in London was caused by the increase in global 
prices of the commodities that Anglo mined. When the prices of these commodities 
began to fall between 2007 and 2008, Anglo’s profits fell with them. The financial 
crises of 2008 did not help either as it left Anglo in more debt. Keeton (interview, 23 
February, 2017) states that moving abroad did not improve Anglo’s profitability but 
instead increased its debts.
According to Keeton, Anglo could not use the money it generated from disposing its 
noncore assets in South Africa to fund the purchase of overseas assets because of the 
presence of the reserve bank regulations in the country which prevented free 
movement of capital from South Africa. Therefore in order to fund the purchase of its 
overseas assets, Anglo was forced to borrow money from the financial markets, being 
unable to use its cash reserves in South Africa because of exchange control 
regulations. In 2010 Anglo’s profits began to improve again as shown by the graph 
below, before falling again in 2011 to 2015. The initial improvement in profitability 
was caused by the end of the global financial crises of 2008 and 2009 while the 
decrease in profitability in 2011 emanated from the increase in the debt that the 
company had put itself in during the period of commodity boom.
Fig 4
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AAL's margins
According to an article which was published by Casey research on (09 December, 
2015) in 2015 Anglo’s sales declined by 19 percent in the first quarter of the year 
when compared to the previous period and also recorded loses of £3.02 billion during 
the first quarter of 2015 compared to £1.46 billion in the first quarter of 2014. Thus, 
being all powerful in South Africa counted for little after Anglo’s move to London as 
evidenced the company’s failure to maintain an improved profitability for the 
company since their move abroad.
4 .6  Equity and Dividend P aym ent to Shareholders
After Anglo’s approval to shift its primary stock abroad by the government, net 
outflows through payments of dividends to new foreign shareholders increased from 
$585 000 000 million in 1999 to $657 000 000 million in 2000 and in 2006 and 2007 
increased by $2 888 000 000 billion and $1 538 000 000 billion respectively (Anglo 
Financial Statements 1998-2015).
According to Padayachee (2008:18), overall “net dividend payments outflows from 
the country increased from under R1 billion in 1998 to about R 9 billion in 2000, to R 
17 billion in 2001, and R24 billion in 2005” as a result of South African companies 
transferring its primary stock markets abroad . Padayachee attributes this increase in 
dividend outflows to an increase in the number of international investors who bought 
stocks from former South African companies that listed abroad. According to an
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online article from the Mail and Guardian, R45 billion left South Africa in the third 
quarter of 2001 as a result of big South African companies that listed abroad, the 
Business Day of 17 March 2013 also reported that in 2007 alone South Africa paid 
out a massive R203 billion in dividends which caused the country to run a dividend 
payment account deficit of R120 billion in the first two quarters of 2008.
Zungu (March, 2013) states that the above increase in revenue outflows through net 
foreign dividends outflows would have been minimised had Anglo and other big 
companies not transferred their primary stock markets abroad.
Fig 7: Equity dividend payment to Shareholders from 1996 to 2015:
Source: Anglo American Corporation financial statements: 1998-2015
The graph above shows that Anglo’s net dividend outflows increased from under 
R500 000 000 in 1998 to about R700 000 000 in 2000, R1 billion in 2005, and R3 
billion in 2006. It further shows that net dividend flows declined in 2007 and 2008 
and that in 2009, Anglo suspended paying its shareholders dividends for the first time 
since 1930s in order to conserve cash during global recession and to improve its 
balance sheet. In 2010, Anglo reinstated paying of dividends to its shareholders and 
suspended them again in 2015.
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4 .7  R estructuring and unbundling-Angk) P ost 1 9 9 9
One of the results of Anglo’s decision to move its primary stock to the London stock 
exchange in 1999 was the selling of most of its non mining assets in South Africa. 
Before moving to London, Anglo had been a much diversified company that had 
interests in the country across different economic sectors of the country such as 
mining, agriculture, forestry, media, manufacturing, and even the automobile 
industry. Such diversity confused potential investors who found it difficult to classify 
what type of a company Anglo was. Anglo had to decide if it was a mining company 
or a conglomerate, and it finally choose the later. By doing so Anglo was forced to 
break up its conglomerate structure and become a focused mining company 
(Robinson, 2016:769).
Having chosen to be a mining company, Anglo began to restructure its operations by 
selling all of its industrial assets, its financial stake in First National Bank (FNB), 
selling its non-mining assets and at the same time buying more mining assets. As of 
May 2006, Anglo had disposed $10 billion of non-core assets, most of them in South 
Africa, and bought $15bn worth of new businesses (Jones et al, 2007: 227-228). The 
new companies Anglo bought included Tarmac Pic in the UK, Shell’s coal interests in 
Australia and Venezuela, the Disputada copper mine in Chile, and the Russian forest 
company, Syktyvkar. In South Africa, the notable purchases, post 1999, were the 
purchases of Kumba Iron Ore and Anglo gold, which were both bought using local 
funds which Anglo had got from the sale of their industrial and financial assets. 
According to Cohen (interview, 15 January, 2017) Anglo has to date not made any 
significant asset purchase in South Africa that warranted their move there.
True to Cohen’s observations, (Chabane et al, 2006:559) also notes that, “rather than 
London listing enabling Anglo to raise capital to fund investments in South Africa, as 
table 2 shows below, there has been much more striking pattern of outward 
acquisitions and investments.
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Table 3: Anglo’s notable acquisitions since 1999
Name of the Company
Country of Incorporation
Cervejon Centrale Coal
Colombia
Cerrejon Zona Norte mines
Colombia
La Disputada
Chile
Empresa Minera de Mantos Blancos Chile
Cerro Vanguardia
Argentina
Acacia Resources,
Australia
Shell Coal
Australia
Anaconda Nickel
Australia
Ashanti Goldfields
Ghana
Skorpion zinc mine
Namibia
Tarmac
United Kingdom
Kumba Iron
South Africa
Syktyvkar forestry company
Russia
Rio Minas
Brazil
Anglo Gold
South Africa
The table above summarizes Anglo’s notable acquisitions since 1999 and it shows 
that most of Anglo’s acquisitions were abroad
4 .8  Sum m ary
This chapter proves that since Anglo listed abroad, it contracted when measured in 
terms of market size, market capitalisation, and that its debts have increased. This 
chapter showed that Anglo’s problems post 1999 emanated from poor decision 
making by its management team. One such decision was the purchase of the Rio 
Minas iron company in Brazil for $6 billion dollars and which cost Anglo a further 
$12 billion dollar of borrowed capital to develop. Spicer (Interview, 07 March, 2017)
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notes that if Anglo had not moved to London, they would not have been in debt 
because, to Harry Oppenheimer, debt was averse. Another downfall of Anglo, as we 
have highlighted in this chapter, was giving its shareholders too much power to decide 
about the future of the company. Such power resulted in the decision to unbundle its 
non-mining assets as per the shareholders’ wish to see Anglo as a focused mining 
company, and not a conglomerate.
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Chapter 5: F indings and R ecom m endations, and  
C onclusion
5.1 F indings
This paper was tasked with answering two questions. In answering the first question 
[What were the factors that led to Anglo to abruptly shift its primary stock market and 
headquarters to London in 1999], this paper found overwhelming evidence which 
suggests that Anglo American Corporation’s decision to shift its primary stock from 
the JSE to the LSE was informed by its fear of political uncertainty in the country. 
One such fear was that the ANC might nationalise big companies in the near future, 
something that it had threatened to do while still an illegal organisation during the 
apartheid period. Anglo’s decision to shift its primary stock, although approved by the 
government, was viciously opposed by the SACP and COSATU, who viewed Anglo’s 
move as a vote of no confidence in the ANC government.
Secondly this paper provided evidence that Anglo American Corporation transferred 
its primary stock and headquarters to London under the guise of wanting to raise 
cheap capital there in order to invest back into its South African operations. Tony 
Trahar’s ridicule of President Thabo Mbeki in 2006, when he publicly mentioned the 
declining of political risk in South Africa, also suggests that the real reason Anglo 
transferred its primary stock to London was to protect its assets from the perceived 
political insecurity in the country, and not to raise cheap capital. Anglo‘s explanation 
of transferring its stock abroad, in order to raise cheap capital in London, was 
therefore disingenuous, as its move was not aimed at developing a global company, 
but was rather a primary defensive strategy.
This paper also shows that, as a result of the company’s move, Anglo began to 
prioritise its foreign shareholders’ needs. One such need was to see Anglo 
concentrating on mining business only, and not being a conglomerate company with 
assets and interests across different sectors of the economy. Acting on this, Anglo 
then sold most of its non-mining assets after the company moved abroad. Anglo’s 
desire to become a global company led it into making several management blunders. 
One such blunder was the purchase of the Rio Minas Iron mine in Brazil, which cost
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Anglo $6 billion to purchase and a further $12 billion to develop, and left the 
company heavily indebted and having to suspend paying its shareholders dividends in 
2010 and in 2016, respectively. Furthermore, since Anglo moved to London in 1999, 
it has not purchased any significant assets abroad that warrant its move there, but 
instead, its profits and market capitalisation have fallen, although that cannot be 
linked directly to Anglo’s decision to transfer its primary stock to London, but rather, 
on the collapse of commodity prices.
With Anglo’s departure, South Africa lost so much of the country’s developmental 
capacity such that to date no single company in the country has been able to fill that 
void. Anglo’s decline is a good lesson of how companies lose their way and why 
leadership and strategic choices matter so much, particularly in an industry in which 
producers are largely price-takers and the industry is ingrained in politics (Cohen, 
Business Day, 4 March: 2016). According to Creamer (2016:1), Anglo’s listing in 
London in 1999 marked the beginning of a “steep downsizing process of 
unprecedented global proportions, which resulted in the company jettisoning two- 
thirds of its commodities and decimating its employee base”. Foreign direct 
investments have also remained weak despite the move to London, and sadly there is 
no evidence that suggests that Anglo increased its investments in South Africa after it 
listed its primary stock market in London.
The second question this paper was tasked with was investigating how Anglo’s 
activities have changed since 1999.
This paper found that, while Anglo was more capitalised and bigger than some of its 
peers listed on the LSE, Anglo by the end of 2015 was the weakest of the three 
diversified miners that are listed on the LSE and has fallen much faster than its peers. 
After listing in London, Anglo was forced to sell some of its industrial and financial 
assets in South Africa that investors had deemed not to be necessary. Anglo has now 
been overtaken in size by its former paper subsidiary company, Mondi. As Cohen 
states, Anglo’s demise was due to the “tendency to bend backwards to satisfy the 
London market even if doing so was not in the best interests of the company”. The 
listing by Anglo in London in 1999 heralded the beginning of the company’s 
downsizing processes, whereby Anglo had to restructure its portfolio and dispose of 
most of its non-core mining assets to suit the demand of new investors in London.
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Had Anglo maintained “its primary listing in Johannesburg, there would have been 
none of the unsettling calls for its disinvestment from this country that kept shattering 
confidence of investors. Anglo's decline is a consummate lesson in how companies 
lose their way and in why leadership and strategic choices matter so much, 
particularly in an industry in which producers are largely price takers and the industry 
is so ingrained in politics”. (Cohen, 2016:01)
5.2 C onclusion
The evidence gathered in this paper reflects that there seem to varying reasons that led 
Anglo American Corporation to transfer its primary stock to London in 1999. Most 
scholars and analysts interviewed agree that, while they also believed that Anglo had 
outgrown the South African market and that London appealed to Anglo because of the 
presence of cheaper capital there, the underlying causes of Anglo’s move to London 
was its lack of trust in the government’s economic and political policies. One such 
policy, which comes up often, is that Anglo was concerned that the ANC government 
would nationalise mines and businesses in future as they had once threatened to do 
when the ANC was still an illegal organisation.
Secondly, what is evident is that, since Anglo moved abroad, its numbers of assets in 
South Africa have decreased. Interestingly since its move, Anglo has purchased only 
one significant asset in South Africa, the Kumba Iron Company, which Anglo 
purchased from the funds the company obtained from selling its non-mining assets in 
South Africa, and not from the proceeds derived from listing in London. More 
interesting is that, since it’s listing in London, most of Anglo’s purchases have been 
abroad and not in South Africa, as the South African government was led to believe.
Had the South African government adopted the Australian approach of duel listing 
primary stock market, Anglo would have still maintained its strong relationship with 
South Africa, and the South African government would have benefited from tax and 
royalty payments Anglo would have paid to it. But unlike the Australians, the South 
African government allowed companies to move their headquarters abroad. By doing 
so, South Africa lost the developmental capacity Anglo would have continued to play 
in the South African economy. Anglo’s move to London also highlights the
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challenges of globalisation in emerging markets. Evidence presented in this paper 
shows that the South African government, despite its good intentions, might have 
made an error in allowing Anglo to move abroad, with the produced results being 
contrary to expectations. On its part, Anglo might have downplayed the challenges of 
being listed in a foreign country, and the power that investors in modem day have.
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